Customer Rating: 
Summary: How mutual hostility can evolve into cooperation.
Comment: Without question, the case studies in this book have applications in biology, sociology, international relations, economics and business. The basic question put forward is, "How is it possible, that in an environment of mutual hostility where acting selfishly will lead to gain against your opponent(s), cooperative behavior between the antagonists will emerge and become the dominant long-term behavior?" It turns out that it is easy to see how such behavior can emerge, even in hostile battlefield conditions. In fact, cooperative behavior has distinct evolutionary advantages.
The solution is found within game theory, in particular the situation known as the Prisoner's Dilemma. Two people, (one and two), who jointly committed a crime are arrested for the crime and placed in separate rooms where they cannot communicate. The police interrogate him or her separately and offer each individual a deal. If they defect and testify against their comrade, they will be given a reduced sentence. In this situation, there are four possible outcomes:
1) Neither defects - both go free, each is considered to have earned a positive reward.
2) One defects and two does not - one is set free and two serves a long sentence.
3) Two defects and one does not - two is set free and one serves a long sentence.
4) One and two both defect - each serve a reduced sentence.
In the problem, reward values are assigned to the results, and typical values are
1) Both one and two are both assigned a value of +3.
2) One is assigned a value of +3 and two the value of -5.
3) Two is assigned a value of +3 and one the value of -5.
4) One and two are both assigned a value of -1.
It is clear that each prisoner wants to avoid the situation where they are the only one who serves time in jail. Therefore, if this event will only occur once, then option four will be the result and cooperation will not take place.
However, if both prisoners have the potential for a future relationship, where that relationship has the real potential for rewards for cooperation and punishments for defecting, then option one can emerge. The best demonstration of this is what took place in some sectors of the western front in the First World War. When the same units faced each other for extended periods of time, a live and let live policy emerged on both sides. Each side adopted a strategy of not engaging in lethal force, unless the other side did. When required to expend artillery ammunition to demonstrate aggressiveness to superiors, they would shoot the same target at the same time of the day. Since their firing was predictable, soldiers on the other side would know to avoid that area and in fact would often climb out of their trench to observe the explosions.
There were instances where German snipers would demonstrate their prowess by continuing to hit the same position on a wall until they made a hole. Therefore, even though superiors admonished the soldiers to continue to kill the enemy and both sides had the capability, the fact that they had a lengthy relationship allowed the cooperation to occur. These phenomena did not take place in regions where units did not face each other for extended periods.
The first chapter describes tournaments, where computer programs competed against each other by defecting or cooperating and the scoring is similar to that of the Prisoner's Dilemma already mentioned. What emerged as the most successful tactic, even when the results of the first round were incorporated into the second round, is the TIT FOR TAT. This strategy is very simple, cooperate in the first round and for each successive round, do what the opponent did in the previous one.
I was fascinated by these results and it was easy to see the obvious implications for relationships of all types. For cooperation to occur, all that is necessary is that there be the expectation of a continued relationship and the potential for future rewards/penalties. What makes it especially interesting is that no appeal to morality, ethics or any other abstract concept need be made. The behavior occurs as a consequence of an increase in the long-term gain for all parties.
Published in Journal of Recreational Mathematics, reprinted with permission.
Customer Rating:
Summary: Be good, be fair and forgive
Comment: A mathematical tale of how, if cooperation can benefit parties (which it very often does), the most profitable behaviour is initial trust (offer a hand), mirroring reciprocity (good for good, bad for bad), total forgiveness (only account for the last move) and lack of any further cleverness, calculations or speculations.
The most amazing results are that, if behaving this way in a minimally stable environment, you never benefit more than your counterpart while you always benefit most overall, that you systematically promote total cooperation, that a few pioneers can teach large groups of non-cooperative bullies and that this behaviour beautifully resists aggression.
The work of Robert Axelrod is amazing in its transparency and applicability, and enlightening in its hopeful conclusions. Thumbs up.
Customer Rating:
Summary: A marriage of science, sociability, and narrative
Comment: Rarely do you get to read a heads up account of a scientific project, understand the science behind it, fathom the possible impact on society, and enjoy the story to boot. This is one of those times. For a bonus, the use of the word evolution in the title will not throw many into paroxysms of indignity upon reading the text, but instead find it appropriate.
"When should a person cooperate and when should a person be selfish?" Not the biggest existential question but perhaps the one most ask and answered. This book addresses this most human conundrum. The writing is direct and the subject interesting. I recommend this book to anyone who has ask themselves the above question. Which means I recommend this book to everyone.
Customer Rating:
Summary: learning about co-operation
Comment: It is really a fantastic book where you can get a lot about the importance of the inter-relationships among people and companies.
Customer Rating:
Summary: Yes, Life-Changing, and Hyper-Connectable
Comment: A lot of interesting material is spun up from a simple premise: a two round tournament of programs for playing Prisoner's Dilemma. Game theory is one of the great cross-disciplinary topics. As the web is woven with nodes as distinct as Jean Jacques Rousseau and why the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor (a personal favorite for Socratic historical discussions), somehow it not only all makes sense, but you are left with the impression that the topic and the book combine to achieve the brass ring of writing: repeatedly fetching the proufound while remaining clear and simple. (Ironically, this book makes a good companion to readings on Complexity and Emergence. But that makes some sense since those topics have turned to automata and the realization that complexity is most often a function of simple constituents iterated.)
Summary: How mutual hostility can evolve into cooperation.
Comment: Without question, the case studies in this book have applications in biology, sociology, international relations, economics and business. The basic question put forward is, "How is it possible, that in an environment of mutual hostility where acting selfishly will lead to gain against your opponent(s), cooperative behavior between the antagonists will emerge and become the dominant long-term behavior?" It turns out that it is easy to see how such behavior can emerge, even in hostile battlefield conditions. In fact, cooperative behavior has distinct evolutionary advantages.
The solution is found within game theory, in particular the situation known as the Prisoner's Dilemma. Two people, (one and two), who jointly committed a crime are arrested for the crime and placed in separate rooms where they cannot communicate. The police interrogate him or her separately and offer each individual a deal. If they defect and testify against their comrade, they will be given a reduced sentence. In this situation, there are four possible outcomes:
1) Neither defects - both go free, each is considered to have earned a positive reward.
2) One defects and two does not - one is set free and two serves a long sentence.
3) Two defects and one does not - two is set free and one serves a long sentence.
4) One and two both defect - each serve a reduced sentence.
In the problem, reward values are assigned to the results, and typical values are
1) Both one and two are both assigned a value of +3.
2) One is assigned a value of +3 and two the value of -5.
3) Two is assigned a value of +3 and one the value of -5.
4) One and two are both assigned a value of -1.
It is clear that each prisoner wants to avoid the situation where they are the only one who serves time in jail. Therefore, if this event will only occur once, then option four will be the result and cooperation will not take place.
However, if both prisoners have the potential for a future relationship, where that relationship has the real potential for rewards for cooperation and punishments for defecting, then option one can emerge. The best demonstration of this is what took place in some sectors of the western front in the First World War. When the same units faced each other for extended periods of time, a live and let live policy emerged on both sides. Each side adopted a strategy of not engaging in lethal force, unless the other side did. When required to expend artillery ammunition to demonstrate aggressiveness to superiors, they would shoot the same target at the same time of the day. Since their firing was predictable, soldiers on the other side would know to avoid that area and in fact would often climb out of their trench to observe the explosions.
There were instances where German snipers would demonstrate their prowess by continuing to hit the same position on a wall until they made a hole. Therefore, even though superiors admonished the soldiers to continue to kill the enemy and both sides had the capability, the fact that they had a lengthy relationship allowed the cooperation to occur. These phenomena did not take place in regions where units did not face each other for extended periods.
The first chapter describes tournaments, where computer programs competed against each other by defecting or cooperating and the scoring is similar to that of the Prisoner's Dilemma already mentioned. What emerged as the most successful tactic, even when the results of the first round were incorporated into the second round, is the TIT FOR TAT. This strategy is very simple, cooperate in the first round and for each successive round, do what the opponent did in the previous one.
I was fascinated by these results and it was easy to see the obvious implications for relationships of all types. For cooperation to occur, all that is necessary is that there be the expectation of a continued relationship and the potential for future rewards/penalties. What makes it especially interesting is that no appeal to morality, ethics or any other abstract concept need be made. The behavior occurs as a consequence of an increase in the long-term gain for all parties.
Published in Journal of Recreational Mathematics, reprinted with permission.
Customer Rating:
Summary: Be good, be fair and forgive
Comment: A mathematical tale of how, if cooperation can benefit parties (which it very often does), the most profitable behaviour is initial trust (offer a hand), mirroring reciprocity (good for good, bad for bad), total forgiveness (only account for the last move) and lack of any further cleverness, calculations or speculations.
The most amazing results are that, if behaving this way in a minimally stable environment, you never benefit more than your counterpart while you always benefit most overall, that you systematically promote total cooperation, that a few pioneers can teach large groups of non-cooperative bullies and that this behaviour beautifully resists aggression.
The work of Robert Axelrod is amazing in its transparency and applicability, and enlightening in its hopeful conclusions. Thumbs up.
Customer Rating:
Summary: A marriage of science, sociability, and narrative
Comment: Rarely do you get to read a heads up account of a scientific project, understand the science behind it, fathom the possible impact on society, and enjoy the story to boot. This is one of those times. For a bonus, the use of the word evolution in the title will not throw many into paroxysms of indignity upon reading the text, but instead find it appropriate.
"When should a person cooperate and when should a person be selfish?" Not the biggest existential question but perhaps the one most ask and answered. This book addresses this most human conundrum. The writing is direct and the subject interesting. I recommend this book to anyone who has ask themselves the above question. Which means I recommend this book to everyone.
Customer Rating:
Summary: learning about co-operation
Comment: It is really a fantastic book where you can get a lot about the importance of the inter-relationships among people and companies.
Customer Rating:
Summary: Yes, Life-Changing, and Hyper-Connectable
Comment: A lot of interesting material is spun up from a simple premise: a two round tournament of programs for playing Prisoner's Dilemma. Game theory is one of the great cross-disciplinary topics. As the web is woven with nodes as distinct as Jean Jacques Rousseau and why the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor (a personal favorite for Socratic historical discussions), somehow it not only all makes sense, but you are left with the impression that the topic and the book combine to achieve the brass ring of writing: repeatedly fetching the proufound while remaining clear and simple. (Ironically, this book makes a good companion to readings on Complexity and Emergence. But that makes some sense since those topics have turned to automata and the realization that complexity is most often a function of simple constituents iterated.)
The read this and pass it on advice from the other reviewer here is good, and apropos, as this is about the infection of cooperative strategies in populations.